Valery Dunaevsky: Japan’s Capitulation

A Digest.

The only U.S. post stamp depicting the nuclear bombing of Japan, which was planned by the U.S. Postal Service to be released in 1995 to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II and the use of atomic bombs on Japan, was rescinded under the protests from Japan and the subsequent White House intervention.

The bombing of Japan with atomic weapons detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the waning days of World War II continues to be a topic of intense debate and remembrance. The event remains so impactful because of the massive loss of life and lasting health effects; the ethical and historical controversy of the event, as well as its global legacy, and impact on Japanese society. In the overall view of the bombings, “traditionalists” argue that the bombings were necessary to end the war quickly and prevent further casualties from a potential and likely protracted American invasion and the continued rise of casualties in countries and territories under Japanese domination. In turn, “revisionists” argue the bombings were unnecessary, possibly even a war crime, and may have been motivated by a desire to intimidate the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, it was Truman who ordered a stop to the third atomic bombing of Japan after the bomb attack on Nagasaki. Since then, the nuclear weapons have never been used. The third, and, as in Nagasaki, plutonium-based bomb, was to be ready for delivery to the target on August 24, 1945.

In this short essay, the author avoids debating either point of view. Instead, he recollects relevant materials, some of which were previously reviewed in the author’s articles in this magazine, and which support the existing opinion that the confluence of several events and factors ultimately led to Japan’s unconditional capitulation on August 15, 1945, which occurred nine days after the atomic attack on Hiroshima.

These events and factors include the deteriorating situation (allied firebombing of major cities like Tokyo and Yokohama, a naval blockade that impeded Japan’s ability to import resources leading to the shortages of food, fuel and raw materials), Emperor Hirohito intervention to accept the Potsdam Declaration of the unconditional surrender, and the shock from various retributions that manifested themselves almost simultaneously. The calamitous retributions —the American nuclear strikes of Hiroshima (August 6) and Nagasaki (August 9) and the Soviet Union’s declaration of war on Japan (August 8), followed by the Red Army’s invasion of Manchuria, Northern Korea, South Sakhalin, Kuril Islands and other Far Eastern territories of the Empire of Japan, as well as the continued flattening of Japan with non-nuclear ammunition by B-29 bombers flying out of the Mariana Islands—rather quickly forced the leadership of Japan to an unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945, which happened, however, after they overcame an internal attempt by a group of officers to resist this action.

The Soviet invasion held crucial significance for Japan’s speedy capitulation and the end of the war, and several factors influenced it. One was the decimation of the powerful Kwantung Army occupying Manchuria, which led to Japan’s deprivation of the natural resources, including oil, needed to support its economy and the war machine. [In the author’s memoir [4], one can find some unique information, the author heard from his relatives and family friends participating in the short but intensive war, about the difficulties the Soviet soldiers met in battling the Japanese troops in the dense bamboo forests of Manchuria.]

Another factor was that, anticipating the American invasion from the East and South, Japan’s northern shores were poorly defended and hence were vulnerable to a Soviet attack on the home islands and their subsequent occupation within days, much earlier than Japan had expected the readiness of the third atomic bomb by the Americans. —The war continued after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki strikes because Japan still did not agree to an unconditional surrender, stipulated by the Potsdam Conference.— The Soviet invasion also deprived Japan of the hope of relying on Stalin to mediate the surrender conditions presented by the Conference.

Japan was in an unfortunate strategic situation. It was losing the war, although it still had 4 million men under arms, 1.2 million of whom were guarding the Japanese home islands. The question, however, was not whether to continue the war, but how to end it on the most favorable terms. Despite demands for unconditional surrender, Japanese leaders hoped that they would find a way to avoid prosecution for war crimes, preserve their form of government, and hold on to some of the territories they had conquered, including Korea, Vietnam, Burma, parts of Malaysia, Indonesia, eastern China, and many islands in the Pacific Ocean. To accomplish these tasks, they had two plans, or strategic options. The first was a diplomatic plan, based on the five-year strategic neutrality pact that Japan had concluded with the Soviet Union in April 1941. Although the Soviet Union had declared in April 1945 that it had no intention of extending the pact, some Japanese leaders, led by Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, still hoped to persuade Stalin to mediate a treaty between his allies and Japan, reasonably believing that it would be in the Soviet Union’s interest for the treaty’s terms to be not very favorable to the United States: the growth of American influence and power in Asia would weaken that of the USSR.

The second plan was a military one and was put forward by Japanese War Minister Korechika Anami. According to this plan, the Imperial Army would inflict enormous losses on the landing U.S. forces, which would cause Washington to accept more favorable terms of surrender. After the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, both possibilities were still potentially feasible. Stalin could still be asked to mediate. In turn, the destruction of Hiroshima did not change anything in the readiness of Japanese troops to meet the enemy on the well-fortified southern shores of the Japanese islands – the supposed landing sites of the Americans. However, the fact that the USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Manchuria and Sakhalin completely crossed out both of Japan’s strategic plans and sharply limited the time for maneuver. Japanese intelligence reported that the Americans would not be ready for landing for several months. At the same time, the Soviet armed forces could be directly in Japan within 10 days. After Manchuria, Northern Korea, and Sakhalin, the USSR was preparing to invade Japan’s northern island of Hokkaido, which was poorly defended. Japan could not resist two great powers at the same time. The aggression of the USSR made the decision to end the war extremely urgent, especially under the threat of renewed nuclear blasts by the Americans.

Although Moscow informed Tokyo in April 1945 that it had no intention to extend the Treaty of Neutrality, the Kremlin shrewdly covered its hostile intentions while quietly transferring masses of troops and ammunition to the Far East after defeating Germany. Unknown to the Japanese, the USSR regaining certain Far Eastern territories after Japan’s defeat was discussed by the Allies with Stalin at the Tehran conference in December 1943 as the condition for the Soviet Union joining the war in the Pacific, while at the Yalta Conference in April 1945, Stalin promised to declare war on Japan (in violation of the Neutrality Pact with Japan of 1941) within three months after ending the war with Germany. In turn, on July 17, at the Potsdam Conference, in a conversation with Truman, Stalin confirmed the promise he made at Yalta. Still, after the successful test of the a-bomb on July 16, 1945, in New Mexico, Truman and Churchill hoped that the bomb would make Stalin’s promises of entering the war with Japan irrelevant. The Allies were concerned that, in the event of a successful invasion, Stalin might seek more concessions than promised to him at Yalta.

Nevertheless, the Lend-Lease deliveries to the Soviet Union continued. These included thousands of vehicles, tanks, and aircraft (the latter mainly were Bell P-39 Airacobra fighters extensively used by Soviet pilots, notably), supplied until September 20. However, September 2 was the day Japan signed the official surrender documents aboard the U.S.S. Missouri. The American support made it much easier for the Soviets to defeat the Japanese forces and thus contribute to Japan’s surrender.

Also, the particular evidence that the Allies, at least in the USA, still wished the Soviet invasion to take place is the American postal envelope of 1945, see below, commemorating the Soviet Union’s entrance into the war with Japan (August 8) and glorifying it. The text on the envelope enthusiastically announces, “Russia declares war on Japan. On Aug. 8th Japan’s worst fears became reality.” The envelope shows the cancellation date as of August 8, 1945. It signifies that the cover was released after the Hiroshima bombing (August 6) and before the attack on Nagasaki (August 9), since Soviet Union’s foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov made the war’s declaration to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow at 11 PM on August 8, Trans-Baikal time (12 hours before the strike) that translates to 5 PM Moscow time and 10 AM Washington, DC time. [As a philatelist, about 30 years ago, I acquired one of the copies of the described envelope.]

References

Валерий Дунаевский, “8 августа наихудшие опасения Японии сбылись. Россия объявила войну Японии”, kontinentusa.com, Аналитика, 6.08.2015.

Val Dunaevsky, “What did crush Japan? The A-bombs or a Soviet Invasion in Manchuria?” kontinentusa.com Аналитика, 7.08.2020.

Alex Wellerstein, “Truman never ordered the use of the atomic bombs – but he did order atomic bombing to be stopped,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, thebulletin.org, August 10, 2025.

Valery Dunaevsky, “A Daughter of the ‘Enemy of the People,’” Xlibris, 2018.

The American postal envelope celebrates the Soviet Union’s entry into the war with Japan.

Copyright ©2025 by Valery Victorovich Dunaevsky